As a cryptography primitive for secure data transmission, certificateless proxy signcryption (CLPS) allows an original signcrypter to entrust his signing authority to a proxy signcrypter for signing specified message on his behalf. In this paper, we combine CLPS with cyclic multiplication groups (CMGs) to construct a new certificateless proxy signcryption scheme from CMGs (CMGs-CLPSS). CMGs-CLPSS will receive significant attention because it simplifies the traditional public key cryptosystem (PKC) and solves the key escrow issue suffered by identity-based public key cryptosystem (IB-PKC). In CMGs-CLPSS, an encrypted message can only be decrypted by a designated receiver who is also responsible for verifying the message; moreover, if a later dispute over repudiation occurs, the designated receiver can readily announce ordinary CLPS for public verification without any extra computation effort. CMGs-CLPSS is proved to have the indistinguishability under adaptive chosen-ciphertext attacks (IND-CCA2 security) and existential unforgeability under adaptive chosen-message attacks (UF-CMA security) in the random oracle model. CMGs-CLPSS outperforms the existing schemes on the basis of computational complexity and is suitable for applications in digital contract signing and online proxy auction, and so on.
I. INTRODUCTION
In traditional PKC, the confidentiality and unforgeability are ensured by first signing the message with a sender's private key and then encrypting message-signature pair using one session key. Subsequently, this session key is encrypted using a receiver's public key before transmission. In decryption and verification phase, the receiver uses his private key to retrieve the session key and then utilizes this session key to decrypt the encrypted message-signature pair. Finally, the receiver confirms the unforgeability of the message by verifying the signature using the public key of the sender. In some occasions for practical applications, simultaneous confidentiality and unforgeability must be satisfied. Signcryption [1] - [9] can simultaneously provide the goals of encrypting and signing the messages, and only allows a designated receiver to recover original message from ciphertext produced by the signer and then to verify the validity The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and approving it for publication was Guangjie Han . of recovered message. Unlike traditional sign-then-encrypt method, signcryption saves computation and bandwidth load.
However, new application demands require the privilege delegation mechanism from time to time to help people entrust their authorities to one person or a group of people in order to accomplish certain work in time, such as online proxy auction, work transfer for deputy or digital contract signing. Conventional PKC cannot satisfy the requirements for new applications in the light of the security robustness and operation efficiency. For satisfying the requirement of applications described above, Mambo et al. [10] proposed the first proxy signature which allows an original signer to entrust his signing authority to a proxy signer on his behalf. Only drawback of proxy signature is that it has the authenticity of signature but is unable to assure the confidentiality of message. For this reason, Gamage et al. [11] first introduced the concept of proxy signcryption in 1999 by combining the functionalities of proxy signature and signcryption, in which an original signcrypter entrusts his signcryption rights to a proxy signcrypter, and the latter signcrypts specified message on his behalf. Later, Ming et al. [12] devised identity-based proxy signcryption scheme in the standard model, its aim is to facilitate confidential transaction with delegation by an authorized proxy. In 2016, Zhou [13] proposed a generalized proxy signcryption from IB-PKC in the standard model, which can resist insider attacks. In 2018, Yu et al. [14] proposed identity-based proxy signcryption scheme in universally composable (UC) security framework. Proxy signcryption from IB-PKC overcomes the problems of large amount of computation, communication and storage costs for managing certificates in traditional PKC. However, they still face the key escrow problem in which the private key generator (PKG) creates the private keys of all users and has full supremacy in signing any message or decrypting any ciphertext at the behest of any user.
Fortunately, certificateless public key cryptosystem (CL-PKC) can solve the problem of key escrow in IB-PKC, this is because the key generation center (KGC) in cooperation with user generates the user's full private key. In 2008, Barbosa and Farshim [15] first proposed certificateless signcryption scheme, however, its performance was not acceptable. In 2010, a certificateless signcryption scheme in the standard mode is proposed by Liu et al. [16] , but it is not secure against malicious KGC attacks [17] , [18] . In 2015, certificateless hybrid signcryption [19] and Leakage-free certificateless signcryption [20] are proposed. In 2017, Yu and Yang [21] devised certificateless hybrid signcryption scheme with low complexity. Up to now, there is no proxy signcryption scheme from both CL-PKC and CMGs. Hence, it is an interesting and important research problem how to construct a secure and efficient CMGs-CLPSS suitable for applications in online proxy auction, ubiquitous computing, cloud computing and mobile agents, and so on.
Contributions: In this paper, we provide a construction of certificateless proxy signcryption scheme from CMGs (CMGs-CLPSS). CMGs-CLPSS is IND-CCA2 and UF-CMA secure under the co-CDH and co-DBDH assumptions. By comparison with the previous schemes, we find that CMGs-CLPSS is more efficient in terms of the computation complexity.
Paper Organization: For the remainder of this paper, we organize as follows. Section 2 reviews some hard problems on which the security of CMGs-CLPSS depends. Section 3 provides the descriptions of notations. Section 4 describes the algorithm definition and security models of CMGs-CLPSS. Section 5 constructs a concrete instance of CMGs-CLPSS and verifies its correctness. Section 6 provides the security analysis of confidentiality and unforgeability for CMGs-CLPSS. Section 7 provides a comparison analysis. Finally, we draw the conclusions of this paper in section 8.
II. HARD PROBLEMS A. BILINEAR PAIRING
Let < G 1 , G 2 , G 3 > denote three cyclic multiplication groups with prime order p. Let g 1 (resp. g 2 ) denote a generator of G 1 (resp. G 2 ), there exists ψ which is an isomorphism from G 2 to G 1 , with ψ (g 2 ) = g 1 . A map e : G 1 × G 2 → G 3 is a bilinear pairing with the properties x and y as follows.
x e g a , X b = e (g, X ) ab for all g ∈ G 1 , X ∈ G 2 and a, b ∈ Z p ; y e (g 1 , g 2 ) = 1.
B. CO-BDH PROBLEM Given < g, g a , g b >∈ G 1 and X ∈ G 2 , the co-bilinear Diffie-Hellman (co-BDH) problem is that it is computationally infeasible to determine the value of e (g, X ) ab ∈ G 3 for unknown a, b ∈ Z p .
C. CO-CDH PROBLEM
Given < g, g a >∈ G 1 and X ∈ G 2 , the co-computational Diffie-Hellman (co-CDH) problem is that it is computationally infeasible to determine the value of X a ∈ G 2 for unknown a ∈ Z p .
D. CO-DBDH PROBLEM
Given < g, g a , g b >∈ G 1 , X ∈ G 2 and U ∈ G 3 for unknown a, b ∈ Z p , the co-decisional bilinear Diffie-Hellman (co-DBDH) problem is to decide whether e(g, X ) ab = U. O co−DBDH oracle outputs 1 if it holds and 0 otherwise.
III. DESCRIPTIONS OF NOTATIONS
See Table 1 .
IV. FORMAL DEFINITION OF CMGS-CLPSS A. ALGORITHM MODEL
A CMGs-CLPSS contains six probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) algorithms as shown in Table 2 : Setup, KeyGen, Extract, PkeyGen, PSigncrypt and Unsigncrypt.
Refer to Table 2 , we now describe each algorithm of CMGs-CLPSS.
Setup is run by the key generation center (KGC) which takes a security parameter k as input and outputs a system master key x along with a set of public system parameters L.
KeyGen is run by a user which takes < L, I i > as input and outputs the public/private key pair < y i , x i > of this user.
Extract is run by the KGC which takes < L, I i , y i , x > as input and outputs the partial private key r i of this user with identity I i .
PkeyGen is a proxy key generation algorithm which takes < L, m w , I a , I p > as input and outputs a proxy key x ap .
PSigncryt is a proxy signcryption algorithm which takes < L, m w , m, I p , I b , x ap , y p , y b , r p > as input and outputs a ciphertext σ to the receiver with identity I b .
Unsigcrypt is an unsigncryption algorithm which takes < L, m w , σ, I a , I p , x b , r b , y p , y b > as input and outputs a message m if the verification equality holds and an error symbol ⊥ otherwise.
B. SECURITY MODELS
A CMGs-CLPSS must satisfy the IND-CCA2 and UF-CMA security. In our security models, we do not consider these queries where the identities of entities are same. CMGs-CLPSS can resist the attacks of two types of adversaries A 1 and A 2 . As an outsider adversary, A 1 cannot corrupt the master key of the KGC but can replace the public key of arbitrary user in an adaptive method. As an insider adversary, A 2 can corrupt the master key of the KGC but cannot replace the public key of arbitrary user.
1) CONFIDENTIALITY
For the confidentiality of CMGs-CLPSS, we may refer to the IND-CCA2 security model in [19] .
In the following, we illustrate the IND-CCA2-I security model of CMGs-CLPSS in terms of an interaction game IND-CMGs-CLPSS-CCA2-I between a challenger C and an adversary A 1 .
At the start of the game, C calls Setup(1 k ) to obtain the master key x and a set of public system parameters L. Finally, C retains the master key x with itself and returns L to A 1 . Phase 1. In an adaptive way, A 1 makes a polynomially bounded number of queries.
Request public key: A 1 requests a public key for identity I i of its choice. C calls KeyGen to calculate its public key y i and returns this public key to A 1 .
Private key queries: A 1 requests a private key for identity I i of its choice. C returns a private key x i as answer if A 1 has not replaced its public key.
Partial private key queries: A 1 requests a partial private key for identity I i of its choice. C calls Extract to calculate its partial private key r i and returns r i to A 1 .
Replace public key: A 1 may replace current public key y i of identity I i with a random number y i .
Proxy key queries: A 1 requests a proxy key for two identities I a and I p along with an authorization certificate m w . C returns a proxy key x ap to A 1 by calling PkeyGen.
Proxy signcryption queries: A 1 submits a query of proxy signcryption for the quaternion < I b , I p , m, m w >. C runs PSigncrypt and returns a ciphertext σ to A 1 .
Unsigncryption queries: A 1 submits an unsigncryption query for the quaternion < I b , I p , σ, m w >. C returns m or ⊥ to A 1 by calling Unsigncrypt.
Challenge. As the first phase is over, A 1 outputs equal-length messages m 0 and m 1 along with < I * b , I * p , m * w >. In the first phase, A 1 cannot query the partial private key for identity I * b and the public key of this identity should not have been replaced. C selects a random number t from {0,1} and obtains σ * relevant to message m t . Finally, C returns σ * as a challenge ciphertext. Phase 2. In an adaptive fashion, A 1 continues to submit a series of queries as Phase 1. A 1 cannot submit a query of partial private key for identity I * b . A 1 cannot extract the private key for identity I * b if its public key has been replaced before challenge phase. In addition, A 1 cannot submit a query to the unsigncryption oracle for σ * after challenge phase.
At the end of IND-CMGs-CLPSS-CCA2-I, A 1 outputs t * as a guess of t. A 1 is said to win IND-CMGs-CLPSS-CCA2-I if t * = t. We define the advantage of A 1 as follows:
In the following, we elaborate the IND-CCA2-II security model of CMGs-CLPSS on the basis of an interaction game IND-CMGs-CLPSS-CCA2-II between an adversary A 2 and its challenger C.
First of all, C runs Setup(1 k ) to generate a set of global parameters L along with the master key x. Finally, C outputs < L, x > to A 2 . Phase 1. In an adaptive way, A 2 makes a sequence of polynomially bounded number of queries.
Request public key: A 2 queries a public key for identity I i of its choice. C runs KeyGen and returns its public key y i .
Full private key queries: A 2 queries a full private key for identity I i of its choice. C returns its full private key < r i , x i > to A 2 .
Proxy key queries: A 2 queries a proxy key for < L, I a , I p >. C runs PkeyGen and returns a proxy key x ap to A 2 .
Proxy signcryption queries: A 2 issues a query of proxy signcryption for < I b , I p , m, m w >. C calls PSigncrypt and returns a ciphertext σ to A 2 .
Unsigncryption queries: A 2 issues an unsigncryption query for < I b , I p , σ, m w >. C executes Unsigncrypt and returns m/⊥.
Challenge. At the end of Phase 1, A 2 outputs same-length messages m 0 and m 1 along with < I * b , I * p , m * w >. A 2 cannot extract the private key of identity I * b in Phase 1. C chooses a random number t ∈{0,1} and calculates a challenge ciphertext σ * of message m t . Then C delivers σ * to A 2 .
Phase 2. In an adaptive fashion, A 2 submits a series of queries as Phase 1. A 2 cannot extract the private key of identity I * b in Phase 2 and should not submit a query to unsigncryption oracle for σ * after challenge phase.
Finally, A 2 outputs t * as a guess of t and wins IND-CMGs-
Definition 2 (Confidentiality):
A CMGs-CLPSS is said to be IND-CCA2 secure if there is no PPT adversary A 1 (resp. A 2 ) to win IND-CMGs-CLPSS-CCA2-I (resp. IND-CMGs-CLPSS-CCA2-II) with a non-negligible advantage.
2) UNFORGEABLITY
For the unforgeability of CMGs-CLPSS, we may refer to the UF-CMA security model in [19] .
In the following, we show the UF-CMA-I security model of CMGs-CLPSS in terms of an interaction game UF-CMGs-CLPSS-CMA-I between a challenger C and an adversary A 1 .
First of all, C runs Setup(1 k ) to obtain the master key x and a set of system parameters L. Finally, C retains the master key x with itself and delivers L to A 1 .
Queries. In an adaptive way, A 1 makes a sequence of polynomially bounded number of queries as Phase 1 in IND-CMGs-CLPSS-CCA2-I.
Forgery. As the queries are over, A 1 generates a forgery < I * b , I * p , σ * , m * w > to C. A 1 wins UF-CMGs-CLPSS-CMA-I if the result of unsigncryption is valid and the queries are subject to several restrictions as follows: x A 1 cannot extract the private key of identity I * a ; y I * a cannot be an identity for which both the partial private key has been extracted and the public key has been replaced; z < I * b , I * p , m * w , σ * > should not be returned by the proxy signcryption oracle.
A 1 's advantage is defined as the probability that it wins UF-CMGs-CLPSS-CMG-I.
In the following, we expound the UF-CMA-II security model of CMGs-CLPSS on the basis of an interaction game UF-CMGs-CLPSS-CMA-II between an adversary A 2 and its challenger C.
At the beginning of the game, C runs Setup(1 k ) to achieve the master key x and a set of system parameters L. Then C outputs < L, x > to A 2 .
Queries. A 2 adaptively submits a polynomially bounded number of queries as Phase 1 in IND-CMGs-CLPSS-CCA2-II.
Forgery. At the end of queries, A 2 outputs a forgery < I * b , I * p , σ * , m * w > to C. A 2 cannot query the private key of identity I * a and < I * b , I * p , m * w , σ * > should not be returned by proxy signcryption oracle. A 2 wins UF-CMGs-CLPSS-CMA-II if the result of unsigncryption is valid.
A 2 's advantage is defined as the probability that it wins UF-CMGs-CLPSS-CMA-II.
Definition 2 (Unforgeability): A CMGs-CLPSS is said to be secure with respect to UF-CMA if there is no PPT adversary A 1 (resp. A 2 ) to win UF-CMGs-CLPSS-CMA-I (resp. UF-CMGs-CLPSS-CMA-II) with a non-negligible advantage.
V. AN EXAMPLE OF CMGS-CLPSS
In this section, we construct a concrete instance of CMGs-CLPSS.
A. SETUP
The KGC chooses a security parameter k and executes this algorithm as follows:
x select three cyclic multiplication groups G 1 , G 2 and G 3 with prime order p and a bilinear map e :
y select a random number x from Z p as the system master key and determine the system public key y by the equality (3):
z define four collision-resistant hash functions (n 1 is the length of authorization certificate and n 2 is the length of message):
{ retain the master key x with itself and publish the system parameters named L, where
In this key generation algorithm, a user with identity I i (i = a, p, b) selects a random number x i ∈ Z p as his private key and VOLUME 7, 2019 determines his public key y i by the equality (5):
In this extraction algorithm, the KGC carries out the following steps:
After receiving r i , this user verifies the legality of the partial private key r i by computing the values at both sides of the equality (6):
Please keep in mind that < r i , x i > (i = a, p, b) is the full private key of the user with identity I i (i = a, p, b).
D. PKEYGEN
In this proxy key generation algorithm, an original signcrypter A with identity I a generates an authorization certificate m w , where m w includes explicit description of delegation relation and the restriction of usage to a proxy signcrypter. Then A calculates V by the equality (7):
and outputs < V , m w > to the proxy signcrypter P with identity I p . If the equality e (g, V ) = e y a , H 3 m w , y a holds, P calculates the proxy key x ap by the equality (8):
In this proxy signcryption algorithm, P chooses a random number µ ∈ Z p and calculates r by the equality r = g µ ∈ G 1 . Then P continues to carry out the following steps:
F. UNSIGNCRYPTION
After receiving σ =< r, c, s >, B computes < ρ, m, φ > by the equalities (9)∼(11):
Then B checks whether the verification equality (12) holds as follows: e (g, s) = e (y a , H 3 (m w , y a )) e yy p , H p e (r, φ) (12) If the equality (12) holds, B accepts the message m and rejects it otherwise.
Correctness of CMGs-CLPSS can be proved by the equalities (13) and (14):
e (g, s) = e g, x ap r p φ µ = e g, x ap r p e g, φ µ = e g, V H VI. SECURITY PROOF A. CONFIDENTIALITY Theorem 1: If a PPT adversary A 1 can break the IND-CCA2-I security of CMGs-CLPSS with an advantage E in the random oracle model by making l i queries to the H i (i = 0, 1, 2, 3) oracle, l p queries to the partial private key oracle, l p queries to the private key oracle, l r queries to the public key replacement oracle, and l ap queries to the proxy key oracle, there exists an algorithm C which can solve the co-DBDH problem with an advantage ε ≥ ε l 1 e l p + l p + l ap + l r (15) where e is the base of natural logarithm.
Proof: Assume C receives a co-DBDH problem instance < g, C 1 = g a , C 2 = g b , X , U > and its aim is to calculate U = e (g, X ) ab . For this aim, C runs the adversary A 1 as a subroutine and plays the role of its challenger in the whole game.
C maintains six lists < L 0 , L 1 , L 2 , L 3 , L k , L ap > which are initially empty, and these lists are made use of tracing the H 0 oracle, H 1 oracle, H 2 oracle, H 3 oracle, public key oracle and proxy key oracle, respectively. C chooses an integer j ∈{1,2,. . . , l 0 } and considers I j as the challenge identity. Let δ denote the probability of I i = I j and the value of δ will be determined later.
First of all, C calls Setup(1 k ) to obtain a set of system parameters L with y = C 1 and then outputs L to A 1 . Phase 1. In an adaptive way, A 1 issues a series of polynomially bounded number of queries.
H 0 queries: A 1 submits an H 0 oracle query. C outputs H i to A 1 if there is a relevant tuple in the list L 0 ; otherwise, C considers two cases to deal with this H 0 query:
Case 1: If it is the jth query, C first sets H i = X . Then C outputs H i to A 1 and stores < y, y i , I i , H i , − > into the list L 0 .
Case 2: If it is not the jth query, C calculates H i = g λ by using a random number λ ∈ Z p of its choice. Then C stores < y, y i , I i , H i , λ > into the list L 0 and delivers H i to A 1 .
H 1 queries: A 1 submits an H 1 oracle query. C outputs f to A 1 if there is a matching tuple < m w , r, ρ, υ > in the list L 1 ; otherwise, C returns υ ∈ {0,1} n 2 of its choice and adds < m w , r, ρ, υ > into the list L 1 .
H 2 queries: A 1 submits an H 2 oracle query. C outputs φ to A 1 if there is a related tuple in the list L 2 ; otherwise, it is necessary for C to consider two cases in response to this query.
Case 1: If it is the jth query, C outputs φ = X to A 1 and stores < m w , m, r, y p , y b , ρ, φ > into the list L 2 .
Case 2: If it is not the jth query, C first sets φ = H p = g λ . Then C stores < m w , m, r, y p , y b , ρ, φ > into the list L 2 and returns φ to A 1 .
H 3 queries: A 1 submits a query to the H 3 oracle. C delivers ζ to A 1 if there exists a matching tuple in the list L 3 ; otherwise, C returns a random number ζ ∈ G 2 of its choice and stores < m w , y a , ζ > to the list L 3 .
Request public key: A 1 submits a public key query for identity I i of its choice. C outputs the public key y i to A 1 if it exists in the list L k ; otherwise, C chooses a random number x i ∈ Z p to calculate y i = g x i . Then C outputs the public key y i to A 1 and stores < I i , x i , y i , − > into the list L k .
Partial private key queries: A 1 submits a partial private key query for identity I i of its choice. C fails and stops this game if it is the jth query; otherwise, C first calls the H 0 oracle and public key oracle, then it updates the list L k with < I i , x i , y i , r i = y λ > and returns a partial private key r i to A 1 . A 1 can verify the legality of the partial private key by the equality (16):
Private key queries: A 1 submits a private key query for identity I i of its choice. C fails and stops this game if it is the jth query; otherwise, C calls the public key oracle along with partial private key oracle and then returns the private key < x i , r i > to A 1 .
Replace public key: A 1 wants to replace the public key y i of identity I i with a random y i ' of its choice. If it is the jth query, C fails and stops this game; otherwise, C replaces the public key y i with y i ' and updates the list L k with < I i , −, y i , r i >.
Proxy key queries: A 1 submits a proxy key query for < I a , I p , m w >. If I a = I j , C fails and stops this game; otherwise, C first calls the H 0 oracle along with public key oracle and calculates V = ζ x a . Then C verifies whether the equality e (g, V ) = e (y a , ζ ) holds. If it holds, C calculates the proxy signcryption key x ap by the equality (17):
Finally, C outputs x ap to A 1 and stores < V , x ap , m w > into the list L ap . Proxy signcryption queries: A 1 submits a query of proxy signcryption for the quaternion < I b , I p , m w , m >. C first calls the H 0 and H 3 oracles along with the public key oracle and (partial) private key oracle, then it considers two cases in response to this proxy signcryption query.
Case 1: If I p = I j , C outputs a ciphertext σ to A 1 by a call to actual proxy signcryption algorithm.
Case 2:
If I p = I j , C chooses a random number µ ∈ Z p and sets r = g µ yy p −1 . Then C continues to calculate < ρ, c, φ, s > by the equalities (18)∼ (21) .
Finally, C stores < m w , m, r, y a , y p , ρ, φ > into the list L 2 and outputs σ =< r, c, s > to A 1 
Unsigncryption queries: A 1 submits an unsigncryption query for the quaternion < I b , I p , m w , σ >. Assume A 1 has queried various oracles before unsigncryption query. It is needful for C to consider two cases in response to this unsigncryption query.
Case 1: If I b = I j , C outputs a result to A 1 by a call to actual unsigncryption algorithm.
Case 2: If I b = I j , C checks the list L 1 to seek a tuple < m w , r, ρ, υ > such that O co-DBDH returns 1 when A 1 queried for < y, r, X , U >. If this case occurs, C calculates < ρ, m > by the equalities (23) and (24):
Then C calculates φ = H 2 m w , m, r, y a , y p , ρ and checks whether e (g, s) = e (y a , ζ ) e yy p , H p e (r, φ) holds. C outputs m to A 1 if the verification is true and ⊥ otherwise.
Challenge. After a sequence of polynomially bounded number of the queries, A 1 outputs < m 0 , m 1 >∈ {0, 1} n 2 along with < I * b , I * p , m * w > to C. In Phase 1, A 1 cannot extract the private key of identity I b . In addition, I * b should not be this identity for which the public key has been replaced and the partial private key has been extracted. C has queried the H 0 and H 3 oracles along with the public key oracle and (partial) private key oracles. C has to consider two cases in response to this challenge query. 
where x * b is from either the adversary A 1 or the list L k . C stores < m * w , r * , ρ * , υ * > into the list L 1 and then calculates < φ * , s * > by the equalities (28) and (29):
Finally, C stores < m * w , m t , r * , y * a , y * p , ρ * , φ * > into the list L 3 and outputs challenge ciphertext σ * =< r * , c * , s * >. Phase 2. In an adaptive method, A 1 continues to submit a polynomially bounded number of queries as those in Phase 1. A 1 cannot query the private key of identity I * b in Phase 2. A 1 cannot extract the partial private key of identity I * b if its public key has been replaced before challenge phase. In addition, A 1 cannot submit a query to the unsigncryption oracle for σ * =< r * , c * , s * > after challenge phase. Guess. At the end of the game, A 1 outputs a guess t * of t. If t * = t, C outputs the solution of co-DBDH problem instance by the equality (30):
In other words, C makes use of the adversary A 1 to solve the co-DBDH problem. Probability analysis. As described above, l p is the times of querying the private key oracle, l p is the times of querying the partial private key oracle, l ap is the times of querying the proxy key oracle, and l r is the times of the public key replacement. As shown in [8] , the probability of C not failing in Phase 1 or 2 is δ l p +l p +l ap +l r , and the probability of C not failing in challenge phase is 1 − δ. Hence, the probability of C not stopping the execution of game is δ l p +l p +l ap +l r (1 − δ), this value is maximized at
Thus, the probability of C not failing in the whole game is at least 1/e(l p + l p + l ap + l r ). In addition, the probability of C uniformly selecting U * from the list L 1 is 1/l 1 . Hence, the probability ε of C in solving the co-DBDH problem is at least ε/l 1 e(l p + l p + l ap + l r ).
Theorem 2: If a PPT adversary A 2 can break the IND-CCA2-II security of CMGs-CLPSS with an advantage ε by asking l i queries to the H i (i = 0, 1, 2, 3) oracle, l p queries to the private key oracle, and l ap queries to the proxy key oracle, there exists an algorithm C which can solve the co-DBDH problem with an advantage ε ≥ ε
where e is the base of natural logarithm. Proof: As a challenger, C takes as input a co-DBDH problem instance < g, C 1 = g a , C 2 = g b , X , U > and its aim is to determine the value of U = e (g, X ) ab . For this purpose, C runs the adversary A 2 as a subroutine in the interactive game.
C maintains six lists < L 0 , L 1 , L 2 , L 3 , L k , L ap > which are empty in the beginning, and these lists are made use of tracing the H 0 oracle, H 1 oracle, H 2 oracle, H 3 oracle, public key oracle and proxy key oracle, respectively. C chooses an integer j from {1,2,. . . , l 0 } and considers the identity I j as challenge identity. Let δ be the probability of I i = I j , and the value of δ will be determined later.
First of all, C runs Setup(1 k ) to obtain a set of system parameters L with y = g x and outputs < L, x > to A 2 . Phase 1. In an adaptive way, A 2 submits a series of polynomially bounded number of queries to C. Queries and answers to the H 0 ∼ H 3 oracles are as those in Phase 1 in Theorem 1.
Other queries and answers are described as follows.
Request public key: A 2 queries a public key relevant to this identity I i of its choice. It is necessary for C to consider two cases in response to this query:
Case 1: If it is the jth query, C sets y i = C 1 and outputs the public key y i to A 2 . Then C stores < I i , −, y i , − > into the list L k .
Case 2: If it is not the jth query, C selects a random number x i from Z p and calculates y i = g x i . Then C stores < I i , x i , y i , − > into the list L k and outputs the public key y i to A 2 .
Private key queries: A 2 submits a private key query for identity I i of its choice. C fails and terminates the game if this query is the jth query; otherwise, C calculates the partial private key r i = g λ . C first calls the public key oracle along with H 0 oracle. Then C outputs < x i , r i > to A 2 and updates the list L k with < I i , x i , y i , r i >. A 2 can verify the validity of the partial private key r i by the equality (33): e (g, r i ) = e (y, H i )
Proxy key queries: A 2 submits a proxy key query for < I a , I p , m w >. If I a = I j , C fails and terminates this game; otherwise, C calculates V = ζ x a by calling the public and private key oracles along with the H 3 oracle. Then C calculates the proxy signcryption key x ap = V H x p p if the equality e (g, V ) = e (y a , ζ ) holds. Finally, C returns x ap to A 2 and stores < m w , x ap , V > into the list L ap .
Proxy signcryption queries: A 2 issues a query of proxy signcryption for < I p , I b , m w , m >. C calls the H 0 and H 3 oracles along with the public key oracle and (private) private key oracles. It is needful for C to consider two cases to deal with this query.
Case 1: If I p = I j , C outputs σ to A 2 by running actual proxy signcryption algorithm.
Case 2: If I p = I j , C chooses a random number µ from Z p and calculates r = g µ yy p −1 . C continues to calculate < ρ, c, φ, s > by the equalities (34)∼(37):
Finally, C stores < m w , m, r, y a , y p , ρ, φ > into the list L 2 and outputs σ =< r, c, s > into the list L 2 . A 2 can easily verify the validity of σ by the equality (38). e (y a , H 3 (m w , y a )) e yy p , H p e (r, φ) = e (y a , ζ ) e yy p , H p e (r, φ) = e (y a , ζ ) e g,
Unsigncryption queries: A 2 issues an unsigncryption query for < I p , I b , m w , σ >. C calls various oracles to deal with this unsigncryption query as follows.
Case 1: If I b = I j , C outputs a result to A 2 by running actual unsigncryption algorithm.
Case 2: If I b = I j , C checks the list L 1 to look through a tuple < m w , r, ρ, υ > such that O co-DBDH returns 1 when A 2 queried for < y b , r, X , U >. If there is this case, C calculates < ρ, m > by the equalities (39) and (40):
Then C calculates φ = H 2 m w , m, r, y a , y p , ρ and checks whether e (g, s) = e (y a , ζ ) e yy p , H p e (r, φ) holds. C outputs m to A 2 if the verification equality holds and ⊥ otherwise.
Challenge. At the end of the first phase, A 2 outputs < m 0 , m 1 >∈ {0, 1} n 2 along with < I * b , I * p , m * w > to C. A 2 cannot request the private key for identity I b in Phase 1. Assume A 2 has queried the public key oracle and (partial) private key oracles along with the H 0 and H 3 oracles before challenge query. It is needful for C to consider two cases to handle this query.
Case 1: If I * b = I j , C fails and terminates this game. Case 2: If I * b = I j , C randomly chooses U * ∈ G 3 and t ∈ {0, 1}. C sets r * = C 2 and continues to calculate < ρ * , υ * , c * > by the equalities (41)∼(43):
C stores < m * w , r * , ρ * , υ * > into the list L 1 and then calculates < φ * , s * > by the equalities (44) and (45):
Finally, C stores < m * w , m t , r * , y * a , y * p , ρ * , φ * > into the list L 3 and outputs σ * =< r * , c * , s * > as a challenge ciphertext.
Phase 2. A 2 continues to submit a sequence of queries to C as those in Phase 1. A 2 cannot request the private key query for identity I * b in Phase 2. A 2 cannot make an unsigncryption query for σ * =< r * , c * , s * > after challenge phase. At the end of the game, A 1 outputs a guess t * of t. If t * = t, C outputs the solution of co-DBDH problem instance by the equality (46): U * = e C 2 , X * a = e y * b , X * b = e g, X * ab (46) Probability analysis. As described above, l p is the times of querying the private key oracle and l ap is the times of querying the proxy key oracle. As shown in [8] , the probability of C not failing in the first or second phase is δ l p +l ap , and the probability of C not failing in challenge phase is 1 − δ. Thus, the probability of C not failing in the whole game is δ l p +l ap (1 − δ), this value is maximized at (please see the equality (31) )
Then the probability of C not failing in the whole game is at least 1/e(l p +l ap ). Since the probability of C uniformly selecting U * from the list L 1 is 1/l 1 . Therefore, the probability ε of C in solving the co-DBDH problem is at least /l 1 e(l p + l ap ).
Theorem 3: If a UF-CMGs-CLPSS-CMA-I adversary A 1 can break the UF-CMA-I security of CMGs-CLPSS with an advantage ε by issuing l i queries to the H i (i = 0, 1, 2, 3) oracle, l p queries to the private key oracle, l p queries to the partial private key oracle, l ap queries to the proxy key oracle, and l r queries to the public key replacement oracle, there exists an algorithm C which can solve the co-CDH problem with an advantage ε , where ε ≥ ε e l p + l p + l ap + l r
where e is the base of natural logarithm. Proof: C takes a random instance < g, g a , X > of co-CDH problem as input and the aim of C is to attempt to determine the value of X a ∈ G 2 . For this aim, C acts as the role of A 1 's challenger of and runs A 1 as a subroutine in the interactive game.
First of all, C calls Setup(1 k ) to obtain a set of the system parameters L with y = g a and outputs L to A 1 .
Queries. In an adaptive way, A 1 submits a sequence of queries including various hash queries, public key queries, partial private key queries, private key queries, public key replacement queries, proxy key queries, proxy signcryption queries, and unsigncryption queries. Moreover, C answers these queries in the same method as those in Phase 1 in Theorem 1.
Forgery. At the end of the queries, A 1 outputs a forgery < I * b , I * p , m * w , σ * > to C. In queries, A 1 cannot extract the private key and partial private key of identity I * p and the public key of this identity should not be replaced. In addition, A 1 cannot request the private key for identity I * a and < I * b , I * p , m * w , σ * > should not be returned by the signcryption oracle.
C fails and stops the game if this query is not the jth query; otherwise, C calls the H 0 and H 3 oracles along with public key oracle. Then C obtains the solution of co-CDH problem instance: Probability analysis. Refer to the analysis of probability in Theorem 1, the probability of C not aborting the simulation is at least 1/e(l p + l p + +l ap + l r ). Therefore, the probability ε of C in solving the co-CDH problem is at least ε/e(l p + l p + l ap + l r ).
Theorem 4: If a UF-CMGs-CLPSS-CMA-II adversary A 2 can break the UF-CMA-II security of CMGs-CLPSS with an advantage E by requesting l i queries to the H i (i = 0, 1, 2, 3) oracle, l p queries to the private key oracle and l ap queries to the proxy key oracle, there is an algorithm C that can utilize A 2 to solve the co-CDH problem with an advantage ε , where
where e is the base of natural logarithm. Proof: C receives a random instance < g, g a , X > of co-CDH problem and the purpose of C is to determine the value of X a ∈ G 2 . For this purpose, C makes use of A 2 as a subroutine and acts as the role of its challenger in the whole game.
First of all, C runs Setup(1 k ) to obtain a set of system parameters L with y = g x and delivers < L, x > to A 2 .
Queries. In an adaptive way, A 2 issues a series of queries to C. Queries and answers are identical to those in Phase 1 in Theorem 2.
Forge. At the end of the queries, A 2 outputs a forgery < I * b , I * p , m * w , σ * >. In queries, A 2 cannot query the private key for identity I * a and < I * b , I * p , m * w , σ * > should not be returned by the signcryption oracle.
C fails and stops the game if it is not the jth query; otherwise, C calls various hash oracles along with public key oracle. Then C outputs the solution of co-CDH problem instance:
If C succeeds in the interactive game, this implies that the equality (53) must hold. Probability analysis. Refer to the probability analysis in Theorem 2, the probability of C not terminating the simulation is at least 1/e(l p + l ap ). Hence, the probability ε of C in solving the co-CDH problem is at least ε/e(l p + l ap ).
VII. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
In this section, we compare CMGs-CLPSS with similar schemes [13] , [22] , [23] from pairings in terms of computation complexity and security. Here we consider computational complexity in the proxy signcryption and unsigncryption phases.
In Table 3 , t H is the time complexity of running a one-way hash function,t P is the time complexity of running a bilinear pairing operation in multiplicative group, and t E is the time complexity of running an exponent operation in multiplicative group. Moreover, Unf denotes unforgeability and Con denotes confidentiality.
As shown in [24] , t P ≈1440t H and t E ≈21t H . From Table 3 , we can readily know the time cost of CMGs-CLPSS is lower than the schemes in [13] , [22] , [23] . Seen from Table 3 , CMGs-CLPSS is an efficient and secure certificateless proxy signcryption scheme.
VIII. SUMMARY
For more complicated business flow processes, secure privilege delegation mechanism has become a necessary function for enterprises, organizations and even every modern citizen. For this reason, we construct a new CMGs-CLPSS, in which the entrustment of signing rights to a proxy signcrypter at the behest of an original signcrypter imparts its utility in various fields such as online proxy auction, mobile agents, cloud computing and ubiquitous computing. CMGs-CLPSS needs no secure channel and is IND-CCA2 and UF-CMA secure in the random oracle model. CMGs-CLPSS can realize secure data transmission and will receive significant attention because it simplifies the traditional PKC and solves the key escrow problem suffered by IB-PKC. In the future work, we are going to construct secure and efficient cryptographic algorithms from CL-PKC using the techniques in [25] - [27] .
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